16 January 2011
START may still stop U.S. missile defense
By Joel McKean
Richmond Times Dispatch

Historically, the Russian Duma acts quickly to ratify international treaties that the country's leaders have signed. In the case of international treaties with the U.S., the process is short and takes place only after U.S. ratification.

In an interview with a Soviet ambassador, I was once told that although the process entails several steps, it is pro forma once the treaty is signed by both parties and ratified by the U.S. Congress.

The SALT II Treaty, signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in 1979, was never ratified by either party. On Jan. 3, 1980, President Carter requested the Senate majority leader to delay consideration of the treaty on the Senate floor in view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In May 1982, President Reagan stated he would do nothing to undercut the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union showed equal restraint. The Soviet Union again agreed to abide by the unratified Treaty.

Subsequently, in 1984 and 1985, President Reagan declared that the Soviet Union had violated its political commitment to observe the SALT II Treaty. On May 26, 1986, President Reagan stated that "the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure."

The new START Treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate last month, has apparently run into a bit of a snag in the Russian ratification process. The first sign of a problem came when Russia indicated that ratification of the START Treaty would take a bit longer than normal because of actions by the U.S. Senate.

Now, according to William Chedsey, writing in Newsmax, "as reported by the Voice of Russia … Russia's Duma, the lower house of parliament, 'plans to confirm the link between the reduction of the strategic offensive arms and the restriction of antimissile defense systems deployment in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),' according to the lawmaking body's foreign policy chief."

The Russian news agency quoted Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, as saying, "Our American colleagues do not recognize the legal force of the treaty's preamble. The preamble sets a link between strategic offensive arms and defensive arms." Russia, in this case, desires the preamble to be legally binding, whereas the U.S. does not.

This issue was raised by many people before ratification was pushed through the U.S. Senate. In fact, an amendment to the treaty that would have deleted the phrase linking strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms was defeated. One reason given at the time was the urgency to ratify the treaty without changes so that Russia would concur in the ratification process.

What if Russia ratifies the treaty while confirming the linkage found in the preamble? What is the next step to be taken by the U.S.? That which was praised as a foreign policy success has the potential now of becoming another international policy embarrassment.

Some would say that it's no big deal: Move on and avoid the embarrassment. Others would argue that we should have taken the time to examine the negotiating records and rejected any such linkage.

The issue of U.S. missile defense and the ability to build whatever is needed to meet future threats becomes more important as inventories of strategic weapons are reduced. The preamble recognizes this but attempts to limit the development of defensive systems by linking offensive and defensive systems. This could weaken the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence capability.

The Soviets tried to make this same linkage years ago, but President Reagan recognized the ploy and insisted on maintaining a defensive capability without any linkage. That START Treaty, without linkage, was ratified by both parties.

Although a noble idea, it is very unlikely we will ever have a nuclear-free world. Imagine a world in which every well-intentioned country got rid of all their strategic nuclear weapons, leaving only two nuclear-capable countries: Iran and North Korea. This extreme example makes the case for missile defense, since otherwise we would be at the mercy of these two rogue states — but the point is that missile defenses become more important as new countries become nuclear weapon capable, particularly when they have missiles with ranges that put us or our allies at risk.

Reliable and effective missile defenses provide the best means of deterring the use of offensive missile systems, and this capability must be preserved for any strategic arms treaty to be viable.

Although other aspects of the START Treaty, such as verification, deserve attention, it is clear from the Russian comments on the issue of linkage between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms that this issue is paramount, particularly if, as reported, Kosachev was, "apparently sneering that U.S. negotiators had been tricked."

Joel M. McKean is a retired brigadier general in the U.S. Air Force who served as executive secretary of U.S. SALT II delegation. He lives in Richmond.