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The first, and most obvious problem for this
administration is answering the question, "What is a space
weapon?" Currently, weapon systems aimed at space—like the
antisatellite capability of U.S. Aegis cruisers,
demonstrated in last year’s
shootdown of a dead spy satellite, or the Chinese
antisatellite weapon
demonstrated in 2007—aren’t "space weapons" at all, and
wouldn’t be covered by a ban on weapons in space. At the
moment, no country has much of a dedicated space-weapon
presence. But improvised or disguised space weapons are
another story. In space, kinetic energies are huge, and
satellites are delicate, making anything with an engine a
potential kinetic-kill vehicle. How would negotiators
account for this problem? That’s not clear.
According to space-weapons analyst Michael Krepon of the
Stimson Center, the best way to address this is to look at
capabilities, not specific weapon systems, and to ban
testing of weapons in, or aimed at, space. This would also
prevent the creation of more space debris, like the kind
left behind by the Chinese antisatellite test. Krepon
suggests a model
Code of Conduct for spacefaring powers.
But why is Obama acting now? As far as we know, neither the
United States nor any other country has a program to deploy
dedicated space weaponry. Is this a clever bit of
misdirection, designed to let the United States look like it
supports arms control without actually having to give up any
capabilities, or is there information out there that has not
been made public? Do we think the Russians, Chinese or
Indians have secret orbital weapons programs?
Of course, the Obama Administration may just want to get
ahead of the curve. The United States military depends on
satellites more than any other nation (and that dependence
will grow if we deploy systems such as
GPS-guided hypersonic cruise missiles), meaning that we
have more to lose if the world pursues a ban on orbital
assets. A suggestion that this might be the reason comes
from another related Obama initiative, one to negotiate "a
prohibition against harmful interference against
satellites." Such a prohibition would discourage attacks.
That’s long been a U.S. goal—President Jimmy Carter first
announced the principle that an attack on an American
satellite would be treated as an act of war—but
incorporating it into its own international agreement is a
new approach.
Critics might argue that a ban on space weaponry would just
breed complacency among law-abiding nations, while giving
cheaters the advantage of surprise. On the other hand, a
crude improvised system probably wouldn’t be that useful,
while a more sophisticated space-based weapons program (one
that went beyond maneuvering exploding satellites close to
their targets) would probably require a fair amount of
testing, making cheating difficult.
The likeliest possibility, though, is that this is mostly
about atmospherics. As China’s interception demonstrated,
attacks on satellites generate dangerous levels of orbital
debris—shrapnel that continues to orbit the Earth for days,
weeks or even years, and that menaces anything in its path.
(And because the debris consists of small, fast-moving and
widely-dispersed fragments, it’s almost impossible to clean
up). This means that no spacefaring power is likely to want
to mount wholesale attacks on another power’s satellites.
The result of any such attack would make space as unusable
for the attacker as for the target. In the next decade or
two, the biggest threats are likely to come from rogue
nations with some space capability, like Iran (which last
week
launched a satellite on its own), or North
Korea—countries that have the ability to attack spacecraft
from the ground, but not a lot of their own satellites at
risk. Perhaps Obama thinks that a space-weapon ban among the
spacefaring nations will encourage them to close ranks
against rogue states that are a threat to everyone. That
would certainly be a positive development.
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