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Introduction
As space
systems increasingly perform and support critical
operations, a variety of plausible near-term incidents
in outer space could precipitate or exacerbate an
international crisis. The most grave space
contingencies—viewed from the perspective of U.S.
interests and international stability—are likely to
result from either intentional interference with space
systems or the inadvertent effects of irresponsible
state behavior in outer space. The threats to U.S.
space assets are significant and growing, as potential
adversaries continue to pursue and could soon acquire
counterspace capabilities. The United States has
strategic interests in preventing and mitigating
dangerous space incidents, given its high reliance on
satellites for a variety of national security missions
and unparalleled global security commitments and
responsibilities. Like other technology-driven global
governance challenges, the longer the United States
delays preventive and mitigating efforts, the less
dominant its position will be in shaping rules of the
road for space.
The Contingencies
Based on
capabilities, intent, and history of malicious or
destabilizing behavior, the state most likely to
undertake destabilizing actions is China, followed by
North Korea, and Iran. Although Russia has robust
counterspace capabilities, it has not recently
demonstrated intent to direct malicious and
destabilizing actions toward U.S. space assets.
Increasingly prevalent types of interference include
jamming, hacking, spoofing, and lazing of space- and
terrestrial-based sensors, transmitters, and data
links. Additionally, interference can entail direct
ascent or "co-orbit" antisatellite tests (ASAT), and
intentional or unintentional collisions that create a
long-term problem of orbital space debris. An outlier
scenario not covered in this report is one that U.S.
officials consider unrealistic: an electromagnetic
pulse event in space. The three most plausible
scenarios that warrant concern are crisis-related
interference, intentional peacetime interference, and
inadvertent peacetime interference.Crisis-Related
Interference
China, North Korea, and Iran could
conceivably be involved in dangerous space
activities—such as a "direct ascent," or vertical
launch, ASAT test from a ground-based missile
system—during a crisis with the United States or one of
its allies to gain bargaining leverage, to deter
potential hostile acts, or for defensive reasons in
anticipation of imminent conflict. The intent of these
activities could be misinterpreted if they cause
unintended harm to U.S. and ally satellites, and could
thereby exacerbate or inadvertently escalate the
crisis.
China has the most active ASAT
development program, having conducted at least six
direct ascent, or vertical launch, ASAT missile tests
since 2005. China has not yet intentionally interfered
with U.S. space assets. However, it has conducted ASAT
tests without warning and signaled intent to undertake
malicious actions. People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air
Force publications argue that shooting down U.S.
early-warning satellites would be a de-escalatory and
stabilizing action in a naval encounter with the United
States.
China might be tempted to demonstrate
its ASAT capabilities during a major crisis to deter
potential U.S. military involvement, such as during a
confrontation with Taiwan or other neighboring states
over unresolved territorial disputes in the East or
South China Seas. The purpose would be to signal its
resolve and willingness to escalate militarily and thus
gain "escalation dominance."
North Korea's
record of provocative military behavior makes it a
plausible candidate to conduct dangerous actions in
space, possibly by leveraging a crude ASAT
demonstration to extract concessions similar to how it
has used nuclear and missile testing in the past. North
Korea placed its first satellite in orbit in December
2012 using a rocket derived from the Taepodong II
missile, which could alternatively be used to destroy
an inactive satellite or maliciously target a U.S.
satellite. Although less likely, North Korea could use
the still untested road-mobile, medium-range Hwasong-13
ballistic missile. Given North Korea's history of
confrontational behavior and provocative language,
interference with or damage to a U.S. or allied
satellite has the potential to escalate into a crisis
and elicit a response from the United States.
Iran also has a long history of engaging in military
intimidation. In the past two years, there have been an
increasing number of near misses in the Persian Gulf
between Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
tactical boats and U.S. Navy ships, and IRGC
surveillance drones and navy helicopters, as well as
multiple attempts by IRGC fighter jets to shoot down
U.S. Predator surveillance drones. Since Iran already
views space as a legitimate arena in which to contest
U.S. military power, Tehran could use similar tactics
against U.S. satellites during a major crisis,
especially if it believes war is imminent—an assessment
that could have self-fulfilling consequences. Should
this significantly limit U.S. situational unawareness
of the unfolding crisis, there would most certainly be
a military response against the source of that Iranian
interference. Additionally, like North Korea, Iran
could attempt a direct-ascent ASAT test or co-orbital
ASAT test, in which it detonates a conventional
explosive near a targeted satellite. Iran's capacity to
do this will likely improve if it follows through on
its June 2013 announcement of plans to build a space
monitoring center designed to track satellites above
Iranian territory. Intentional Peacetime
Interference
Intentional acts of interference
during peacetime include: probing the technical
capabilities of U.S. space systems or ground-based
sensors; spying on the location and capabilities of
U.S. satellites; and denying or limiting U.S.
intelligence collection from space satellites through
electronic jamming, blinding optical systems, and
issuing false instructions, known as "spoofing." These
space disruptions are distinct from computer
hacking—i.e., the unauthorized access to a network, or
the manipulation of software source code, the
originating source of which can be hidden through dummy
IP addresses or server rerouting. These interferences
are usually stand-alone demonstrations of national
power, and are similar to the interferences that
routinely affect air and sea systems on earth. However,
no established "rules of the road," comparable to the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, exist to regulate
space operations.
According to U.S. officials,
Iran undertakes more purposeful interference with U.S.
military and commercial space systems using lasers and
jammers than any other country. Although these actions
have not resulted in irreparable damage to U.S. assets,
this practice increases the possibility that the United
States will misinterpret unintended harm caused by such
interference. In the worst-case scenario, a routine
lasing or jamming attack could cause unintended damage
to U.S. or allied space assets—primarily due to
untested and less advanced capabilities—precipitating a
crisis with China, North Korea, or Iran at an acutely
sensitive time, amid ongoing efforts to prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Unlike in the
cyber domain, attributing the source of intentional
space interference is relatively easy to date. It
requires identifying the source of a disruption to a
datalink, or to space-based and terrestrial
transmitters and receivers. Those sources provide a
return address and usually offer a distinct signature.
However, interference in space, particularly that which
does not result in sustained damage to satellites, is
less likely to arouse suspicion due to the distant
nature of the domain, which can also encourage
deliberate interference and shrouding of military
purposes as civilian or scientific. Inadvertent
Peacetime Interference
The main form of
inadvertent peacetime interference is the testing of
ASAT systems that create space debris, which already
threatens U.S. space assets and assured access to the
domain. China's demonstrated disregard for the
consequences of ASAT tests is the greatest threat to
international space security.
A January 2007
direct ascent ASAT test carried out by China against
its defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite instantly
increased the amount of space debris in low earth orbit
(LEO) by 40 percent. Debris is especially problematic
in LEO, where half of the world's 1,100 active
satellites operate. Space objects—even flecks of
paint—travel as fast as eighteen thousand miles per
hour and can cause catastrophic damage to manned and
unmanned spacecraft—creating even more debris in the
process. The U.S. National Research Council estimates
that portions of LEO have reached a "tipping point,"
with hundreds of thousands of space debris larger than
one centimeter stuck in orbit that will collide with
other pieces of debris or spacecraft, thus creating
exponentially more debris. Significant growth in the
quantity or density of space debris could render
certain high-demand portions of outer space unnavigable
and inutile. Currently, there are no legal or
internationally accepted means for removing existing
debris.
China could also test co-orbital
antisatellite systems in which an interceptor
spacecraft destroys its target by exploding in close
proximity, creating even more debris. For several
years, Beijing has conducted a series of close
proximity maneuvers with its satellites in LEO; the
most recent occurred after a July 20, 2013, launch of
three satellites on the same rocket, which have since
conducted sudden maneuvers toward other Chinese
satellites. Human or operating errors during these
maneuvers could inadvertently result in a collision
that produces harmful debris. While these maneuvers
could eventually be used for civilian purposes, most
U.S. officials believe these experiments are primarily
intended to demonstrate latent ASAT capabilities.
An ASAT test that causes unintended damage to U.S.
and ally satellites or an accident in space caused by
debris could trigger a major international crisis
between the United States and China. The risk is
heightened by the fact that both countries have no
pre–space-launch notification arrangements, similar to
the U.S.-Russia agreement on notifications of
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches.
Management of such a crisis could also be hindered by a
lack of direct communication between U.S. authorities
and the PLA agency that oversees Chinese military space
launches. Warning Indicators
As China, North
Korea, and Iran's space capabilities continue to grow,
the following strategic and tactical warning indicators
would suggest that a dangerous space event is
forthcoming.
Strategic warning indicators
include statements of intention to interfere with or
develop the capability to interfere with space
operations of other powers during a crisis or wartime;
evidence of such intent, including research and
development or budget indicators, organizational
changes, or intelligence collection; noticeably
increased efforts to disrupt space communications using
lasers or jammers against satellites or ground-based
transmitters; or the sudden and unexplained launch of
additional satellites into LEO, accompanied by an
increase in aggressive or potentially hostile
maneuvers.
Certain indicators are suggestive of
potential military escalation or onset of conflict.
These include a heightened diplomatic crisis involving
the United States and China, North Korea, or Iran that
could result in terrestrial military escalation and
trigger a crisis-related interference in space;
militarized tensions or direct conflict between one of
the three countries and the United States, a U.S.
treaty ally, or a non-U.S. ally with known space
capabilities, such as India or Russia; or an internal
power struggle among governing elites in China, North
Korea, or Iran, prompting space activities intended to
consolidate domestic power or stoke nationalism.
Tactical warning indicators tend to be more overt.
They include significant changes in the alert status or
operational readiness of military units associated with
China, North Korea, or Iran's missile or space
programs; the unexpected announcement of the closure of
airspace to civilian aircraft over the territory of
previous space launches; or preparations for missile
tests from satellite launching stations which are
usually detectable days, if not weeks, in advance.
Space launches from road-mobile missile units, although
closely monitored, would likely occur with less
warning, if any. Additional indicators include specific
space-related warnings or rhetoric, or the declaration
of an antisatellite or ballistic missile defense test,
although no warning would be issued. The 2007 Chinese
ASAT test that destroyed an LEO satellite was not
preceded by any specific warnings.
Implications for
U.S. Interests
The United States has three
primary national interests in preventing or mitigating
the dangerous space contingencies detailed above, which
would threaten U.S. or allied space assets and produce
mass space debris, imperiling assured access to space.
First, the United States depends on space systems
more than any other country, which is unlikely to
change in the future. No other state spends as much on
its space activity (75 percent of global space funding
is by the United States), or has a greater stake in a
safe and secure space (43 percent of all active
satellites are U.S. owned). Threats to U.S. satellites
would reduce the country's ability to attack suspected
terrorists with precision-guided munitions and conduct
imagery analysis of nuclear weapons programs, and could
interrupt non-cash economic activity depending on the
severity of the attack and number of satellites
disrupted. Moreover, although space debris threatens
all international space assets, the United States
depends especially on satellites in the portions of LEO
where the greatest debris is found for encrypted
communications, reconnaissance over Afghanistan,
missile defense, and other missions critical to
national security.
Second, as the most active
global security manager with unmatched commitments, the
United States would be more affected by an unstable or
insecure space commons than any other country. In
January 2012, the Obama administration announced its
commitment to help broker an International Code of
Conduct on Outer Space Activities, which would be an
informal arrangement based on freedom of access to
space for peaceful purposes, preservation of the
security and integrity of space objects in orbit, and
due consideration for the legitimate defense interests
of states.
Third, as the primary guarantor of
space access, the United States has a strong interest
in promoting responsible behavior in space or at least
preventing space activities that have the potential to
become a source of international instability or
potential conflict, in space or on the ground.
Intentional or crisis-related interference in space
would undermine the norm of equal access to space for
all by introducing space as a domain for crisis
bargaining, as well as prompting its further
militarization—both of which would be highly
destabilizing to international political dynamics. The
U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) helps to protect the space domain by providing
conjunction assessment notifications to government and
commercial space operators when their satellites are
predicted to collide with other satellites or space
debris. JSpOC gathers this information with its "space
fence" of ground-based radars and optical sensors
located throughout the world.
Threats to
military or civilian satellites could limit the timely
and accurate information available to civilian
decision-makers and military commanders during crisis
situations. This is compounded by how difficult it
would be for officials to quickly interpret whether a
satellite malfunction was caused intentionally or
inadvertently by humans, a damaging space phenomenon
(such as solar flares), or routine mechanical failure.
Attributing who or what is responsible for such a
disruption in space is usually possible, but requires
equipment, analysts, and time—all of which may be in
short supply during a crisis. This situation could also
create a first-strike incentive for U.S.
decision-makers seeking to act before its understanding
of a terrestrial dispute or its space situational
awareness—the ability to view, characterize, and
predict the location of manmade objects in space—is
interrupted or further degraded.
Preventive Options
The United States has several unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral options for preventing
dangerous space events most detrimental to U.S.
interests.
In addition to taking further steps
to improve the survivability and redundancy of U.S.
space assets and enhance its ability to detect
dangerous space activities and debris, the United
States could undertake other unilateral measures, such
as declaring a moratorium on all ASAT testing to
pressure other states to do the same. The United States
could also promote a nontreaty prohibition of direct
ascent ASAT tests. However, given that this would limit
the operational requirements of mid-range U.S.
ballistic missile defenses, such an agreement would be
infeasible because of intense domestic political
opposition. Moreover, while an ASAT and direct ascent
ASAT ban would be beneficial to U.S. security, it is
unlikely that China, North Korea, or Iran would agree
to, let alone abide by, such agreements. Additionally,
emerging space powers, such as Russia and India, may
prioritize the development of space capabilities in an
effort to match those of other space powers.
The
United States could issue clear and specific public
warnings to deter malicious activity in space. As of
yet, U.S. deterrent threats are confined to Pentagon
planning documents, or have been applied with little
specificity to cyber and space domains
contemporaneously. If the space event was detected
during the planning stage by the U.S. intelligence
community, or it became clear that a country developing
space capabilities intended to use them maliciously and
the resultant space debris could be predicted by JSpOC,
the United States could publicize the costs that such
debris would pose to the world's satellites in an
attempt to marshal international condemnation to
prevent it.
Military options to deter impending
actions, or respond if necessary, include deploying
naval assets toward a potential adversary, placing
regionally based bombers on high-alert status,
attempting to intercept a space launch with the
sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defense system (a
near impossibility for far inland China launches), or
attempting to preemptively strike the space launch
platform with long-range bombers or conventionally
armed ballistic missiles. Though the United States
possesses advanced direct ascent ASAT capabilities,
employing them against Chinese, North Korean, or
Iranian space systems would signal that such acts were
normal behavior and create space debris threatening to
U.S. space assets.
Beyond these unilateral
options, the United States could issue private
demarches to warn and educate China, North Korea, or
Iran of the consequences of a direct ascent or
co-orbital ASAT test. The United States could initiate
trust-building measures with specific countries to
reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict. For example,
U.S. officials could work with Chinese military leaders
to establish rules of the road for space, such as
announcing space launches and implementing emerging
industry standards for debris mitigation, which could
be included as part of the U.S.-China military
discussions on common understandings for international
airspace, the open seas, and cyberspace. Currently, no
legal or nonbinding instruments governing outer space
exist other than the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space. U.S. diplomats could also request greater
clarity from North Korea and Iran about the intent of
their space activities.
Multilaterally, the
United States could continue to develop and promote
bilateral and multilateral transparency and
confidence-building measures in outer space, expanding
on the UN Group of Governmental Experts' roadmap
published in July 2013. This would include information
exchanges and notifications, consultative mechanisms,
shared space situational awareness, and the publication
of national space policies. Likewise, the United States
could seek to advance discussions in the UN Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which is
developing best practices for space debris and
collaborative space situational awareness.
Mitigating Options
The United States has several
options to mitigate the consequences of a dangerous
space event.
If JSpOC characterized the space
debris threat accurately in advance, high-demand U.S.
satellites could undertake debris avoidance maneuvers
to relocate to safer orbital slots. Predictive
conjunction notices could be provided to all
spacefaring nations and satellite operators. In
preparation for such an event, policymakers could
develop contingency plans to shift high demand military
or civilian satellite communications from threatened
U.S. satellites to available commercial satellites. The
United States could mandate that government and
commercial satellites include enhanced resilience and
recovery capacities, such as passive shielding,
hardening electrical circuits, and turn-off systems.
Additionally, the U.S. military could expand training
for operating in GPS-denied or communications-denied
environments, in case military or military-dependent
satellites are disabled.
The United States could
attempt to establish a dedicated, bilateral crisis
communications channel between JSpOC and its equivalent
Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian space agencies, to
issue warnings and demarcations, and facilitate
cooperation in times of crisis to prevent escalation
and mitigate damage to space assets. This might be
unlikely in the near term, but could be pursued over
time. JSpOC already has a time-delayed mechanism to
provide this information to China, and the U.S.
military and its Iranian counterpart communicate in
real time to prevent misunderstandings. This is even
less feasible in the case of North Korea, given there
is no current direct communications mechanism with the
United States.
The United States could work with
other spacefaring nations to develop multilateral and
international legal agreements, strategies, and plans
for safely removing existing or future space debris.
The reduction of space debris in orbit would make
additional debris-creating space events less of an
immediate and long-term threat to all space assets.
Recommendations
Due to its reliance on space and
unmatched space situational awareness and demonstrated
record of leading global action, the United States has
a unique obligation to lead international efforts to
prevent or mitigate a dangerous space event by
implementing the following recommendations:
- Upgrade the JSpOC space fence radars and sensors, which
are aging and strained, and provide limited coverage of
the southern hemisphere. This is estimated to cost up
to $2 billion.
- Expand the scope of data-sharing
agreements with other countries and commercial space
operators—beyond the thirty-five current agreements
with commercial operators and five with countries
(Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and Italy)—to
improve overall space situational awareness.
- Establish regulations mandating best practices for
space debris mitigation for all U.S. government and
commercial space assets, such as requiring that
satellites be maneuvered into "graveyard orbits" at the
end of their lifespan so they burn up in the
atmosphere.
- Test and develop large debris removal
techniques through bilateral and multilateral pilot
programs with other spacefaring nations.
- Increase
transparency and confidence-building by announcing that
the United States will not test or deploy antisatellite
capabilities. This would be similar to the unilaterally
declared U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Moratorium of
1992, which the United States has adhered to since. The
moratorium was emulated in the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty ratified by 161 states including
Russia.
- Publicize growing concerns about China's
ASAT capabilities, mirroring what has been done to
address Chinese threats to the maritime and cyber
domains; no senior U.S. government official has issued
a statement on space since January 2012, signaling that
threats are not a priority.
- Dedicate more assets to
improve intelligence collection and analysis of the
command-and-control arrangements for China's, Iran's,
and North Korea's space assets to better understand
which officials would authorize a dangerous space
incident and how they could be influenced.
- Undertake
contingency planning for a diplomatic and military
response if such a threatening antisatellite test
occurred, similar to planning that has been conducted
for catastrophic cyberattacks on U.S.-based critical
infrastructure; this has yet to be undertaken at a
senior level.
- Ask allied and partner countries with
stronger diplomatic ties to China, North Korea, and
Iran to raise specific U.S. concerns about those
countries' potentially destabilizing behaviors in
space.
- Begin formal discussions with Chinese
government leaders to increase transparency and
predictability for both American and Chinese actions in
space, as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue process.
- Work with Congress to repeal the
2011 provision that prevents Chinese officials or
experts from visiting the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's facilities to allow for
bilateral civilian space cooperation with China.
- Increase focus on brokering an International Code of
Conduct on Outer Space Activities with the largest
number of states, to improve stability in space by
promoting rules of the road for responsible space
behavior.
Conclusion
Though the United
States has limited leverage over the actions of China,
North Korea, and Iran in space, it does have numerous
options available to mitigate or prevent dangerous
space incidents and limit the multiplication of space
debris that threaten U.S. space assets and assured
access to the domain. Some policymakers will argue that
these recommendations require too much transparency
into U.S. space operations and could pose operational
constraints. Others will contend that these do not go
far enough to address the reality of space threats and
that the United States will waste its diminishing lead
role if it does not take more proactive and radical
steps. But U.S. policy must balance both demands by
implementing the practical set of recommendations
provided in this report. On the current path, the
likelihood of potentially dangerous space incidents
will only increase, whereas a renewed focus on
preventing and mitigating such events would markedly
reduce this threat. If the United States wishes to
better guarantee its access to space as China, North
Korea, and Iran advance their capabilities and other
space powers emerge, it must intensify its efforts to
have an impact or forsake its role in shaping rules of
the road for space.
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