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In its 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR), the Obama administration
announced that it would adopt a Phased
Adaptive Approach (PAA) in the Asia Pacific
region, but this has yet to be formalized.
Platforms, such as the Patriot system and
Aegis Ship, and sensors, such as diverse
land-based radars, required for phase 1 of
the Asia Pacific Phased Adaptive Approach (APPAA),
are already in place. Based on this, there
has recently been a speed-up in the
building of the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South
Korea missile defense, considered the core
of the APPAA. Some warn that the allied
countries lack formal agreements that
clarify and resolve potential controversies
surrounding various issues, such as
integrated approach, rules of engagement
and command and control. But now there
seems to have been considerable progress in
eliminating such obstacles.
Current Conditions related to Missile
Defense between the United States and its
Allied Countries in the Asia Pacific Region
U.S. MD System in Northeast Asia
The United States deployed the THAAD
(Theatre High-Altitude Area Defense) MD
system in Guam in 2013 in response to the
so-called threat of the North Korean
missile Musudan. The U.S. Department of
Defense has requested the deployment of 32
Aegis ships by 2014, and 41 Aegis ships and
over 300 Standard Missile-3 interceptors by
2018. As of late 2013, 16 Aegis destroyers
had been deployed as part of the Pacific
fleet.
In addition, U.S. Forces in Japan deploys
24 Patriot PAC-3 launching pads, and U.S.
Forces in Korea deploys 48 PAC-3 launchers
(2 battalions) in Suwon, Osan, Kunsan, and
Daegu.
U.S. Forces in Japan operates the AN/TPY2
MD radar in two regions of Japan (Shariki
Air Self-Defense Force base and the
Kyogamisaki Air Self-Defense Force Base),
and is scheming to deploy the THAAD system
in South Korea.
Japan’s MD System
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force
currently possesses four Aegis ships, and
plans to upgrade two of its destroyers to
be BMD-capable by 2019 as well as procure
two more Aegis BMD-capable destroyers.
Japan is jointly developing the SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor missiles with the United
States.
Japan possesses 18 PAC-3 batteries and 36
launchers.
It also deploys seven state-of-the-art
FPS-3(advanced model) and 4 FPS-5 radars.
It is considering the deployment of a
space-based early warning system in the
late 2010’s.
Japan is considering the introduction of
the THAAD system and plans to deploy the
Aegis Ashore SM-3 interceptor missile.
Should it acquire all these systems, Japan
would have a four-layered missile defense.
South Korea’s MD System
South Korea possesses two PAC-2 battalions
(8 batteries, 48 launchers), procured from
Germany, and is in the process of upgrading
to PAC-3. South Korea also plans to
directly procure PAC-3 from the United
States.
South Korea also possesses three Aegis
destroyers but they are not equipped with
interceptor missiles. It plans to introduce
three additional Aegis destroyers between
2022 and 2028.
USFK deployment of the THAAD system is
becoming a fait accompli, and there is talk
of South Korean forces acquiring the THAAD
system and the SM-3 and SM-6 interceptor
missiles.
Meanwhile, South Korea is in the process of
developing M-SAM and L-SAM. The operational
deployment of M-SAM is projected for
2018-2019, and L-SAM for 2023-2024.
In terms of sensors, South Korea currently
operates the Aegis SPY-1D radar with a
detection range of 1000 km along with 2
(Super) Green Pine early warning radars
with a detection range of 500 km for Block
A and 900 km for Block B.
It plans to construct an AMD Cell by 2015
and interface it with the USFK’s TMO Cell.
Australia’s MD System
In cooperation with the United States,
Australia maintains several early warning
radar sites but currently has no BMD
intercept capability.
The Australian navy plans to procure two
Aegis vessels to equip them with BMD
capabilities against short- and mid-range
ballistic missiles.
Distant from Northeast Asia, Australia is
only at risk from ICBMs but has no plans to
counter such missiles with BMD.
Australia has been participating in
trilateral MD discussions with the United
States and Japan.
Expectation of THAAD Deployment in South
Korea and U.S.-led MD in Northeast Asia
THAAD is not aimed at North Korea but aimed
at China
The THAAD system’s effectiveness in
intercepting North Korean ballistic
missiles is extremely limited.
A North Korean short-range ballistic
missile, with its short range and low
apogee altitude, is difficult to intercept
with the THAAD system.
The KN-02, with a range of 120 km, has an
apogee altitude that is below the THAAD
system’s intercept altitude of 40-150 km.
If launched at a lower angle of fire, the
Scud B, with an apogee altitude of 90km, is
also capable of evading the THAAD system’s
intercept altitude. If launched from north
of Pyongyang at a lower angle of fire, the
Scud C, with an apogee altitude of 150 km,
can also evade the THAAD system’s intercept
altitude as it targets South Korea’s
capital and central provinces. Therefore,
it can only be concluded that THAAD is
really designed to intercept China’s
mid-range ballistic missiles aimed at USFK
bases.
With a detection range of 1000-2000Km, the
THAAD system’s AN/TPY-2 radar is capable of
detecting potential threats from missile
bases in northeast and central China.
Therefore, the THAAD radar can detect
China’s mid-to-long-range ballistic
missiles aimed at the United States and
Japan and provide early warning to the
U.S.-Japan intercept system.
Some of U.S. and South Korean military
officials point to North Korea’s Rodong
missile as the reason for the need for
THAAD deployment.
But the likelihood that North Korea would
attack the South with its Rodong missile is
virtually zero.
With a range of over 1,300 km, the Rodong
missile is a weapon system designed to
counter Japan, U.S. Forces in Japan, or
U.S. reinforcements in the event of a
contingency on the Korean peninsula.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that North
Korea would forgo its short-range ballistic
missiles, such as Scud B or C, which are
much better suited for an attack on the
South, and choose to strike with a Rodong
missile.
If North Korea were to attack the South
with a Rodong missile, it would have to
launch it at either a higher or lower angle
of fire, but raising the angle of fire
slows down its speed and lengthens its
flight time, thereby making it easier to
intercept. Attitude control also becomes
more difficult, thereby diminishing its
accuracy.
The Significance of THAAD Deployment in
South Korea in U.S.-led MD in Northeast
Asia
THAAD deployment in South Korea makes
U.S.-led MD in Northeast Asia closer to
completion.
In terms of information gathering, the
THAAD radar would radically expand its
ability to detect and track China’s
ballistic missiles. Along with the PAC-3,
it would also create a multi-layered MD
system to defend against Chinese ballistic
missiles aimed at USFK bases.
THAAD deployment in South Korea means South
Korea becomes a U.S. MD outpost against
China.
U.S.-Japan-South Korea (Military)
Information-Sharing Arrangement for the
Building of U.S.-led MD in the Northeast
Asia
The signing of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
military information sharing arrangement is
the key to constructing the U.S.-led MD in
the Northeast Asia. The United States and
Japan are scheming once again the signing
of the General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between
Japan and South Korea.
By linking the MD systems of Japan and
South Korea, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
military information-sharing arrangement
and the Korea-Japan GSOMIA integrate the
U.S.-Japan-South Korea MD systems to
complete the Northeast Asia MD system under
U.S. and Japanese leadership.
U.S.-Japan-Korea Combined MD Exercises
and the Creation of an MD Operational Plan
and Command Control Structure
Every two years, the U.S. Strategic Command
conducts 'Nimble Titan', multilateral MD
exercises, which include Japan, Australia,
EU, and South Korea as participants.
Every year, the United States and Japan
conduct Keen Edge, a BMD command exercise.
Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force is the
only military force that has jointly
trained with the United States in an
exercise that is not a simulation but a
kinetic training based-BMD exercise.
Since 2012, the United States, Japan, and
South Korea have held combined MD exercises
called Pacific Dragon.
The Creation of an MD Operational Plan
and Command Structure between the United
States and South Korea.
South Korea and the United States have come
to agreement on 'the Concepts and
Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance
Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations'
and based on this, plan to create by 2015
an operational plan (OPLAN) that mobilizes
U.S. MD assets.
The mobilizing all of U.S. MD assets in an
ROK-U.S. combined operational plan means
what used to be an operational plan to
defend South Korea from the North would be
expanded to become, in effect, an
operational plan against China at least in
relation to MD operation.
Mobilizing U.S. MD assets in an ROK-U.S.
combined OPLAN against North Korea and
integrating this with South Korea’s MD
means South Korea’s MD will become
subordinate to U.S. MD and South Korea’s MD
operational command will be according to
U.S. strategic interests and under direct
U.S. operational command. In the event of a
contingency, the United States, which
already has wartime operational control
authority over South Korean forces, would
also exercise control over ballistic
missile detection and interception against
North Korea and China. While its capability
to intercept North Korea’s short-range
ballistic missiles remains limited, this
increases the probability of South Korean
MD assets being committed to the defense of
the United States, Japan, and U.S. Forces
in Japan, as well as to support Japan’s
exercise of the right of collective self
defense.
On April 16, 2015, U.S. and South Korean
military officials agreed to create a
'Deterrence Strategic Committee' to lead in
the creation of a combined MD operational
plan, including the concretization of the
concept of 4D (Detect-Defense-Disrupt-Destroy).
Combined MD Operation and Command
Structure between the United States and
Japan
Based on information produced through their
sensors, the United States and Japan carry
out joint operations from their joint
operation command center at the Yokota Air
Base outside Tokyo. Based on information
acquired through their radar, the joint
operation command center quickly decides
which country has the responsibility of MD
interception. In relation to MD, it can be
said the United States and Japan have built
a truly joint command relationship.
Formation of South Korea-U.S.-Japan
trilateral MD and military alliance in
Northeast Asia, and expansion of NATO into
the Asia Pacific region
The relationship between Japan’s
exercise of the right of collective self-defense
and South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral MD
A key scenario mentioned by the Abe
administration [Japan] of its exercise of
the right to collective self-defense is
that Japan would intercept ballistic
missiles aimed at the United States, U.S.
bases and/or U.S. naval ships. For this,
early detection of ballistic missiles fired
from North Korea or China is pivotal, and
this would be premised on South Korea, the
United States and Japan sharing information
about ballistic missiles from North Korea
and/or China and forming a trilateral MD.
By signing the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
military information-sharing arrangement
and becoming an axis in the trilateral MD,
South Korea effectively assumes a
supporting role in the exercise of
collective self-defense by Japanese Self-Defense
Forces, which seeks eventual invasion on
the Korean peninsula.
Formation of South Korea-U.S.-Japan
military alliance based on construction of
trilateral MD
The construction of a trilateral MD system
among South Korea, U.S. and Japan means
building a trilateral military alliance.
The three countries will accelerate
combined MD training exercises and
intensify maritime interdiction trainings,
such as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) against North Korea, to
expand the military relationship between
Japan and South Korea in the areas of
operations and logistics assistance and
advance the trilateral relationship to a
(quasi) military alliance. The U.S. and
Japan are also pushing for signing the
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
Meanwhile, should South Korea decide to
acquire an SM-3 interceptor missile in the
future, it will most likely procure it from
Japan, and this would make South Korea,
which may also import F-35 parts from
Japan, dependent on Japan in the area of
logistics.
The construction of the South Korea-Japan
MD and military alliance raises the
possibility that South Korea will become a
subordinate partner to Japan and under
Japanese control across the board in the
areas of information, operations, and
logistics. Furthermore, we cannot rule out
the possibility that, with Japan’s exercise
of its right to collective self-defense,
South Korea could be partially under the
control of Japan’s tactical operation in a
South Korea-U.S.-Japan combined operation
against North Korea and/or China.
Prospects of APPAA, Expansion of NATO
into the Asia Pacific region and Structure
of Confrontation in Northeast Asia.
During his visit to South Korea and Japan,
Martin Dempsey, Chair of the U.S. Joint
Chief of Staff, announced, “We're making
progress on building an integrated air and
missile defense umbrella, (and) both the
(South) Koreans and the Japanese have made
some commitments in procurements on their
side to make us more interoperable.”
Dempsey’s comment signals that APPAA, with
the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral MD as
its basis, is making significant progress.
From now on, the key points in the APPAA
will be the coordination of interests and
an agreement that reflects all parties’
interests regarding the level of the
interface of MD assets and radars among
South Korea, United States, Japan, and
Australia, the exercise of command and
control, and rules of engagement, etc.
Meanwhile, the South Korea-U.S.-Japan
military alliance, combined with the
U.S.-Japan-Australia (quasi) military
alliance, builds a front line surrounding
North Korea and China in the Asia Pacific
region.
Also, the South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral
alliance will merge with NATO, which
already expanded to the Asia Pacific region
when countries in the region joined it
through individual partnership - South
Korea in 2012, Australia in 2013, and Japan
in 2014.
The APPAA, combined with the Middle East
Phased Adaptive Approach (MEPAA) and the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA),
would build MD on a global level and bring
about the formation of a multilateral
military alliance in the Asia Pacific
region as well as a global military
alliance.
The U.S.-led construction of a global MD
and military alliance is provoking strong
opposition from China and Russia. This can
result in the creation of a structure of
Cold War-like military confrontation in
Northeast Asia between the U.S.-Japan-South
Korea-Australia versus North
Korea-China-Russia.
The Vice Foreign Minister Conference among
South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, held in
Washington D.C. on April 16, 2015, and the
fourth International Security Conference
centered around North Korea, China and
Russia, held in Moscow, symbolically
represent the rising military tension based
on the building of MD and military
alliances in the Asia Pacific region.
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