Rapid Deployment on Missile Defense is a Bad Idea by James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon International Herald Tribune |
(OpEd) WASHINGTON -- Proponents of national missile defense are urging
President-elect George W. Bush to move quickly to deploy a system to
protect the United States against potential ballistic missile attacks from
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China. They argue that he will be making a
major mistake if he lets his administration subject missile defense to a
lengthy policy review. It will give opponents time to organize and
inevitably entangle the issue in the 2002 congressional elections. Instead
of waiting, they conclude, Mr. Bush should seize the moment. This
assessment may tempt the new president. Mr. Bush could move quickly and
adopt the Clinton administration's missile defense deployment schedule,
which proposes beginning construction of a key radar in Alaska next year.
If Moscow refused to revise the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty to permit a
nationwide defense, the United States could then withdraw from the treaty.
Although a momentous step, President Bush could argue that he was merely
following Bill Clinton's lead. By making deployment seem inevitable, Mr.
Bush might overwhelm the domestic political opposition in the short term.
But from a longer term perspective, rapid deployment is a bad idea. It
could leave the United States with a mediocre missile defense, strained
relations with most European allies, and major problems with Moscow - not
to mention Beijing. American national security could suffer, particularly
if a brusque defensive deployment led Moscow to terminate bilateral
programs to secure its frighteningly dilapidated inventory of nuclear
warheads and materials. Such an outcome would eventually fracture whatever
domestic political support for missile defense the Bush administration had
enjoyed. Rather than moving quickly on missile defense, Mr. Bush should
move sensibly.
He should remain unwavering in his commitment to defending the United
States. But he does not need to commit immediately to a specific
technology, or to take steps that would violate the ABM Treaty until 2002,
or perhaps even 2003. He has time to proceed deliberately for four reasons:
Even if Moscow says nyet in the end and the United States must withdraw,
intensive negotiations would do more to assuage Moscow's worst-case
security fears and to secure allied support for deploying a national
missile defense than a capricious decision to abandon the treaty. But
knowing in advance that Mr. Bush was firmly committed to deployment, and
that he was also considering boost-phase defenses, Moscow might well agree
to revise the treaty rather than face the prospect of unconstrained
American national missile defenses.
The Bush administration should work to find a way to defend the allies too.
The Clinton administration's proposed anti-missile system would protect the
United States but not its allies. But leaving the allies unprotected
seriously diminishes the system's strategic benefit. Saddam Hussein could
blackmail the United States by threatening to destroy Paris or London or
Tokyo - including the thousands of Americans living there - instead of New
York or San Francisco.
Proponents of national missile defense are right that the Bush
administration should be unyielding in its commitment to defend America.
But that does not require immediate treaty-busting actions that favor
unpromising defensive technologies. Acting resolutely should not mean
rushing to failure.
The writers, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution in Washington,
contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. |
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